Introduction
In 2017, the Canadian government unveiled its updated defense policy, Strong Secure, Engaged (SSE) aimed at recalibrating defence priorities in response to significant shifts in the global strategic landscape.i SSE serves as a guiding framework for the procurement of new equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and outlines how it will respond to future threats. Canada is part of a broader trend in updating defence polices, as members of the Five Eyes (FVEY) alliance are engaged in their own defence modernization initiatives which places a significant emphasis on the integration of emerging technologies. This strategic evolution is motivated by the increasing geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific region, where factors like China’s ascendance as a major power have prompted FVEY members to enhance their own military capabilities. Canada’s connection to FVEY is further amplified by the fact that the U.S. plays a considerable role in the alliance, as Canada’s other defence priorities such as North American continental defence involve a close relationship with the U.S. Ultimately, the cases of FVEY defence modernization efforts presents some intriguing lessons for Canada and its experiences with military technological innovation. This analysis surveys the primary defence and strategic documents from Canada’s FVEY allies (United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand) for relevancy to Canada’s experience with emerging technologies. The analysis concludes with an assessment of the next steps for Canada in terms of emerging technologies and Canadian defence based on the experiences of FVEY.
Overall, this review finds that the U.S., U.K., and Australia are leading the FVEY alliance in integrating advanced technologies more effectively than Canada and New Zealand. In particular, other FVEY members have been better at enhancing their defense bureaucracies and militaries to operationalize these technologies through frequent policy updates, specialized strategy documents, technology-focused exercises, improved Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) capabilities, and commitments to cooperative procurement systems. However, this has provided Canada with unique insights to shape and innovate how it can approach the integration of emerging technologies for national defence.
The United States
Since the release of SSE, the Trump and later Biden Administrations have released new National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. Each NSS has differed in tone; the Trump Administration released its NSS in 2018 and it was guided by a self-described “America First” approach to world affairs that lessened the emphasis on cooperation with allies; while the Biden Administration’s 2022 NSS reversed that trend, promoting foreign alliances as key tools of U.S. policy. Despite these differences, both identified great power competition as an important driver of defence policy decisions and both documents emphasized the importance of different emerging technologies. They also emphasized deterrence against adversaries as well as the importance of continental missile defence. Both NSS documents also warned of the likelihood of cyberspace threats and the need to strengthen government capabilities in this domain; both documents also argued for the importance of space capabilities and of the enabling power of emerging technologies. The 2022 NSS was more specific in terms of technologies discussed, mentioning the strategic relevancy of AI and quantum computing, as well as the importance of jointness and interoperability when it comes to operationalizing technology.ii For a full list of technologies discussed in recent U.S. defence documents, see Annex 1.
Guided by the NSS policies from the Trump and Biden Administrations, the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) has developed a series of documents that have helped drive the military’s technological modernization process and meet its desired objectives. The National Defense Strategy releases of 2018 and 2022 stress the importance of emerging technology, homeland defence and the role of the joint force as key areas of focus for the U.S. military. The U.S. is undergoing a review and modernization of its nuclear forces, as well as its missile defence capabilities, and linked to that is the importance of space and cyberspace, as well as digitized C4ISR. The U.S. military has identified that joint force capabilities are essential to pan-domain operations, and digitization will be essential to conducting this task. To accomplish this focus, the U.S. military is focusing tech investments on developing an integrated digitized network of different systems that relies on microelectronics, space-based platform, AI (particularly human-machine teaming), quantum computing, biotechnologies, and big data.iii Underpinning this modernization process is the goal of establishing functional JADC2 which links the technological transformation to the military’s ability to operate across any and all domains, including space and cyberspace. To further enhance the coordination efforts, the DOD has released a JADC2 strategy guide, that has built formal guiding principles for its integration across the military.iv
The U.S. has several emerging technological investments centred on hardening North American air defences. A number of these new procurements are centered on developing anti-missile capabilities. There are plans to develop modernized anti ballistic missile weapon systems such as a new Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, new sea-based SM-3Blk IIA interceptors, and a new Kill Assessment system of space-based infrared sensors. There are also plans to test the potential of direct energy weapons for the missile defence mission. Documents such as the 2019 Missile Defense Review identify Canada as an important partner in North American air defence, although Canada’s specific role in a missile defence system is made less clear.v In relation to this, the U.S. has discussed strengthening and modernizing NORAD, noting that there is a need to outpace competitors with innovative uses of technology, as the most recent NORAD strategy states that, “American and Canadian people are safe and secure today but, without intentional efforts to counter our competitors’ fast-paced advances, our competitive advantage will erode.”vi
The U.S. military and DOD has prioritized the integration of AI into defence policy and operations, and as a result has produced numerous strategies to guide the process. AI is seen to have widespread application across the military, particularly allowing for better application of joint capabilities. The DOD outlines a broad range of needs for AI, including building policy and safety infrastructures as well as clear ethical guidelines to guide its use and integration. Specific areas identified for AI’s use are the enhancement of situational awareness and decision making; increasing safety of equipment use and operations; and relevancy to sustainment and business process.vii The U.S. views public-private partnerships as a potential driver of AI development and integration; approaching AI from a crowd-sourced perspective allows different voices from civilian academia and industry to shape how AI is developed for defence.viii The U.S. DOD has understood that the AI challenge has shifted how it approaches technological development, with official AI strategies stating that “[t]his reality requires that we ensure our access to the millions of publicly available algorithms, many of which can solve the perpetual issues plaguing a number of our core missions and key business process.”ix To guide and accelerate the integration of AI in the military, the U.S. will be developing new procurement processes, research and development programs with AI driven machine-human teaming, building regulatory and ethical guidelines for the integration process; and fostering an AI-educated personnel group that can build a pro-AI organizational culture across the DOD and military.x
In 2023, the U.S. released its updated AI strategy titled, Data Analytics and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy, which explicitly links the importance of the integration of AI, data and digitization as a unity of effort. This AI strategy presents a fairly advanced implementation plan to guide the process, including designating the offices and institutions tasked with monitoring the progress of the efforts. Further, the latest strategy has been shaped considerably by lessons learned analysis of previous implementation efforts of earlier DOD AI and Data strategies. Overall, the DOD’s Data Analytics and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy outlines a sophisticated understanding of the challenges surrounding the integration of emerging technology.xi
The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force have all released updated modernization strategies designed to accelerate the JADC2 process. The emphasis is on building digitizing C2 and communication networks, leveraging cloud-architecture and AI to better handle data, while trying to standardize and streamline business operations; all while fostering better collaborations with private sector industry. The technological transformation for the service branches will lead to advanced space and cyber capabilities, increased usage of advanced autonomous robotic systems, more accurate ISR, and faster decision-making cycles. The modernization will also involve close collaborations with the private sector, especially on research and development, and business operation matters. The intended end state of these modernization efforts will be an integrated joint force that is capable of handling pan-domain operations in any contingency.xii For example, the Army’s digital transformation process is planned to be completed by 2035 (with initial operational integration to begin in 2028), where it is intended to have a functional cloud-computing network as well as integrated machine learning and AI capabilities during operations and business practices. This process will involve building cloud-based open-architecture for Army networks; standardizing IT practices and digital requirements; leveraging newer 5G technology; and overall fostering an organizational culture that embraces this digitization.xiii Another example is the Navy’s vision for future task forces will involve integrated reliance on space capabilities, new sensors and unmanned systems, as well as a new generations of precision long range munitions to enhance the capabilities of legacy ships.xiv
The United Kingdom
The U.K. has positioned emerging technologies at the forefront of their attempts to update their foreign and defence policy (for a list of technologies mentioned in U.K. defence documents, see Annex 2). The 2021 Global Britain strategy identifies technology as key for the U.K. and its allies to maintain a competitive edge over adversaries, especially with regards to China and Russia. It reaffirms the importance of modernizing the U.K.’s nuclear weapons, while also developing newer systems such as hypersonic and direct energy weapons. The U.K. policy calls for a “cyber ecosystem” of interlinked technologies such as digital networking and quantum computing to improve defence capabilities in a pan-domain environment.xv Overall, Global Britain pledged that the U.K. will be a “a science and technology superpower” and that its military “will be able to keep pace with changing threats posed by adversaries, with greater investment in rapid technology development and adoption.”xvi
Subsequent defence strategic documents have laid out a vision for the U.K. military to gradually integrate JADC2 related capabilities, emphasizing the building of digital networks and further developing ISR, cyber and space assets. The U.K. will focus on a number of major procurement projects for their Army, Air Force and Navy, with an emphasis on investing in systems that use advanced sensors, networked capabilities and long-range precision strike capabilities. Data and digital networking are not just an enabler, but as a cornerstone of their approach to future operations; and the future role of automation in the U.K. military will be largely shaped by human-machine teaming.xvii
U.K. defence documents particularly highlight the importance of AI, including the release of their Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy in June 2022. The AI strategy outlines a pathway for the integration and exploitation of AI by the military and Ministry of Defence (MOD). AI is interpreted by the U.K. MOD as a general-purpose technology, meaning that its adoption is seen as holding relevancy for a large portion of defence operations (including warfighting operations across all domains) and business processes. AI is linked to the integration of robotics, such as allowing the military to utilize drone swarms in operations. AI is also connected to diversity and inclusion programs as the strategy identifies it as a potential enabler of diversity efforts due to AI’s need for a diverse userbase to offset learning biases that could degrade its operationalization. The U.K. has already began testing the use of AI during military exercises in order to better process how it can improve data analysis during ongoing operations.xviii The U.K. is planning to have AI readiness capabilities by 2025, and sees the private sector as a key driver of this process.xix Overall, the U.K. MOD identifies AI as playing a central role in shaping future international affairs, noting that “[f]uture conflicts may be won or lost on the speed and efficacy of the AI solutions employed.”xx
In addition to AI, the U.K. defence documents also cite the importance of space capabilities. As a result, the U.K. released the Defence Space Strategy in February 2022. In it, the approach is driven by two key factors, the desire to increase space domain awareness as well as space control. A core part of this involves the deployment of a new generation of satellites to enhance communications and data processing and act as surveillance platforms. The Space Strategy provides an in-depth outline of the operational context of outer space and the necessary capabilities that U.K. defence will need to utilize to maintain space-control. Further, the strategy describes cooperative opportunities with allies and key partners, as well as provides guidance for opportunities for domestic industry.xxi
Australia
The most recent Australian defence policy update was released in 2023 and represents a fairly ambitious modernization project for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The geographic focus of these investments is the wider Indo-Pacific region which is seen to be increasingly dangerous due to the rise of great power competition. The central objectives of this modernization process are to increase the military’s digital network capabilities to prepare for future operations in a pan-domain environment. Further, that the Australian military is also focusing on C2 digitization, recapitalizing air and missile defence capabilities, as well as improving the military’s capacity for long range precision strikes (see Annex 3 for a list of technologies mentioned in Australian defence documents). The Australian defence policy mandates that specific frameworks and organizational structures need to be built for space and cyberspace capabilities which will help accelerate the modernization process.xxii Essentially, the Australian policy update identified advanced technologies as having central importance to national defence, stating that Australia “must have a national science and technology system that enables the development of disruptive military capabilities, including harnessing advanced and emerging technologies to provide asymmetric advantage for the ADF.”xxiii
The most innovative and impactful component of this Australian modernization process was the announcement of the AUKUS agreement among Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. that commits the three allies to cooperating on a number of technological development issues, including, cyber capabilities, AI, quantum technologies, long range munitions, countermeasures systems, and submarines. The first major AUKUS related procurement project will be the delivery of four conventionally armed nuclear submarines to Australia. The new policy also calls for streamlined procurement timelines to allow equipment to be operationalized faster. The former Australian approach to procurement was deemed too slow for the contemporary international security environment which is characterized by continuous rapid changes, therefore, the Australian government has aggressively sought to reform it.xxiv
AUKUS is building off previous Australian defence cooperative relationships, such as Australia’s close bilateral relationship with the U.S. on defence matters. A cooperative technological project between Australia and the U.S. that relates to procurement is the MQ-28A Ghost Bat RPS (Remotely Piloted System), which is being developed as a joint project. The program is prioritized as it will cost less and be more easily replaced than manned platforms which conduct similar operations.xxv
The Australian Ministry of Defence (MOD) has also published their Defence Cyber Security Strategy in order to build cyber capabilities for the military. The strategy views cyberspace as a warfighting domain and emphasizes focusing on personnel skill and governance policies for cyber issues, as well as technological development. A central part of how Australia plans to rapidly build its cyber defence capabilities is via partnerships with domestic industry and technological diffusion from allies.xxvi In addition to the cyber strategy, the MOD has also released a strategy for Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence. Here, AI and robotic technology is characterized as rapidly changing and thus there needs to be planning for short, medium and long term trends and their relations to defence policy objectives. AI is seen in particular as having a wide range of operationalization outputs, including the use of human-machine teaming for force protection, as well as the use during business operations. The Australian MOD has launched an ‘Autonomous Warrior’ programme to formally demonstrate, test and evaluate the military applications of AI and robotic systems.xxvii
New Zealand
New Zealand’s updated defence policies emphasize the importance of the Indo-Pacific as their primary strategic focus. Great power competition is alluded to as an important driver of their policy, as is the environmental security concerns related to climate change. Technology is not a prominent focus of their 2021 released defence policy, nor the 2023 policy update; however, they identify the FVEY alliance as an important factor in procurement and technological development. Their defence policy also mentions different emerging technologies such as quantum computing, AI and various information technologies.xxviii New Zealand has also released a modernization plan to cover the 2019-2025 period in which technology plays a larger role. In particular, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) prioritizes developing network enabled capabilities, and cyber and space related investments. The NZDF is prioritizing investments that emphasizes C4ISR to allow for a faster and more accurate information and command cycle to unfold, which in turn should improve joint force and interoperability with allies. In terms of major procurement projects, the Navy will receive new surface ships; the army will undergo a digitization programme and ISR investments; and the Air Force will receive new RPS.xxix Defence documents also outline how in some circumstances, the military will be able to turn to “off the shelf” private sector purchases to streamline procurement efforts.xxx For a list of technologies listed in recent New Zealand defence documents, see Annex 4.
Implications for Canada
We previously published a review that delved into Canadian defence’s recent experience with emerging technologies. The article provides a comprehensive mapping of Canadian defence technological trends and lays a foundational analysis to better understand the relevancy of the FVEY experiences. By revisiting this initial piece, readers can gain a deeper understanding of the importance of relevant lessons learned illustrated by this current article.
The earlier survey of the Canadian developments showed that since the release of SSE Canada has achieved fairly mixed results in terms of acquiring and integrating advanced technologies for its armed forces. Essentially, Canada has achieved gradual progress on larger procurement items, but unfortunately remains lacking in terms of its wider technological modernization efforts. The review concluded that, “SSE did not then represent a technocentric shift in Canadian defence policy; rather, it is best understood as one that takes a relatively risk-averse approach to the role of technology for defence”, and although there was a reasonable amount of defence related discourses surrounding advanced technologies, Canada has been unable to translate that into tangible outputs, noting that “Canadian defence is essentially maintaining a trend of analysis paralysis”.xxxi
The comparison of Canadian and FVEY experiences with emerging technologies during the same period, demonstrates that Canadian defence is underdeveloped in terms of active capabilities as well as its conceptual understanding of how best to leverage the current generation of technologies. Lessons learned can be drawn from across FVEY to help illuminate a number of organizational efforts that can help guide Canadian defence policy as it moves forward with the integration of emerging technologies.
The case of FVEY contributes to a stronger empirical understanding of how states can respond more effectively to the integration of new military technologies. The members of FVEY have each undertaken transformative efforts to better incorporate these new technologies into their defence policies. In particular, the U.S., U.K., and Australia have successfully achieved more advanced integrative effort than Canada and New Zealand. These three states lead FVEY in developing a stronger conceptual understanding of these new technologies’ potential and have also undertaken the necessary steps to build the structures within their defence bureaucracies and militaries to best operationalize their usage. These actions include more frequent defence policy updates; the drafting of strategy documents for specialized technologies; technology-centric field exercises; upgrading JADC2 capabilities; and making commitments to establish more effective procurement systems including inter-allied cooperative agreements.
Policy, Strategy, and Plan Updates
The consistent and timely release of formal defence policies, plans and strategies can play an integral role in keeping Canadian defence focused on modernization efforts. In particular, the U.S., U.K., and Australia have updated their defence policies since 2017 with major periodic update documents that are intended to help guide their policy efforts based on changing circumstances in the global strategic environment. While SSE was intended to lay the foundation of Canadian defence for the next two decades, the world has changed considerably in the seven years since its initial release; and this is predominately the case for the emerging technology sector as areas like AI have seen considerable evolution in that time. Having more frequent defence policy, strategy and plan updates will allow Canada to reassess capabilities, investments, and procurement needs on a more rapid basis and give officials a firmer understanding of whether the procurement system is able to meet current demands. Further, more frequent updates will allow DND to adjust research and development efforts based on more up to date technological trends and data inputs from current operations and global events. Underpinning the need for more formal defence document updates is that contemporary technological development is unfolding at an incredibly rapid pace, as such policy reviews are needed to keep pace and take into account the latest trends. Positively, the recent Canadian defence policy update, pledges that Canada will publish a National Security Strategy every four years, and that defence reviews will follow the same schedule.xxxii However, there will likely be a need to update more specific strategies and plans that cover different elements of defence in greater depth. Further, the future National Security Strategy and policy review updates must be guided and shaped by sound analysis, that accurately reflects shifts in the international system, while also reflecting internal strengths and weaknesses.
One of the major efforts undertaken by other FVEY members is the publication of technology specific strategies. The U.S., U.K. and Australia have all released strategy documents to help guide their defence policy efforts for specific technologies such as AI, space, cybersecurity, and even RPS and robotics. For example, the AI defence strategy documents produced across the rest of FVEY describe the formal processes in which AI centric research, development and experimentation will unfold, especially with private-sector industry collaborations. These documents also outline the pace and scale of AI centric changes, which includes the establishment of formal ethical guidelines and governing structures to oversee that AI conforms to the laws and values of the states. Lastly, the AI strategy documents produced by other FVEY members also outline how AI will be used during military operations. Aside from national strategic documents, other FVEY members have also produced military service branch specific strategy guides for emerging technologies. For example, Australia has released a Navy AI strategy that goes into detail as to how AI will affect maritime affairs. The United States is by far the most advanced FVEY member of this trend, as it has produced not only service branch specific technology strategies but has also updated doctrinal manuals and unit tactics to better accommodate the new technologies.
Canada should follow the lead of the U.S., U.K., and Australia and develop specific strategy documents, as well as advanced organizational implementation plans to guide the integration of certain key emerging technologies, which includes AI, cyber capabilities, space capabilities, quantum, and RPS. These emerging technological trends have among the widest application to any and all CAF missions, as well as CAF and DND business practices, and thus they should be prioritized in terms of their integration. Positively, the DND and CAF has released initial AI and quantum strategies, however, updates that provide more detailed guides are needed to oversee deeper integration across the organizations. These should not just be vision documents, but rather offer tangible planning solutions for the various integrative challenges for each of the emerging technologies, including firm ethical guidelines and governance infrastructures.
Technological Training and Experimentation
The CAF should routinely seek to experiment with different emerging technologies during military field and tabletop exercises. This will give CAF personnel hands-on experience with the newest technologies which is essential for the development of a pro-technological organizational culture within the military, as well as helping to incubate innovative strategic thinking about their future applications. Field and tabletop exercise with emerging technologies will not only accelerate their integration but will also help foster best practices. There is also the potential to leverage synthetic environmental technology to allow for advanced digital training simulations to help shape decision-making by CAF and DND personnel regarding advanced technologies while also reducing costs.[xxxiii] In addition to exercises, integration efforts of emerging technologies should take Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) considerations into account, especially when it comes to the integration of AI. Since AI and machine learning is impacted by user data, having diverse inputs from a wider range of gender, race and age demographics will be essential to mitigating biases that could in turn lead to less effective usages of the systems. Taking GBA+ factors into account early in the integration process will lesson the probability of disruptions down the line.xxxiv
Allied Relations
Some FVEY members are seeking to leverage bilateral and trilateral defence agreements to accelerate procurement projects and share defence technologies. The U.K. has long turned to its bilateral defence relationship with the U.S. to bolster its defence capabilities, however, most recently the AUKUS security partnership is the most significant of these structures. These agreements allow for the diffusion of physical technology as well as knowledge and data in a highly streamlined manner. This allows junior partners to significantly benefit from working closely with the U.S. and its considerable resources. Aside from bolstering the speed and effectiveness of procurement systems, agreements like AUKUS are intended to provide considerable assistance in enhancing jointness and interoperability among members.
Canada should explore building firmer inter-allied pathways for joint procurement projects to allow for smoother and quicker diffusion of technological knowledge. Australia’s participation with AUKUS presents a key case study to understand how these defence pact agreements can lead to quick and tangible technological outputs that will strengthen military capabilities. Ideally, Canada would be able to leverage its pre-existing defence relationship with the U.S., the world’s leading military power, given the two countries’ shared border, close history and pre-existing defense relationships such as NORAD and NATO. The desired outcome of leveraging inter-allied procurement efforts is not only to help speed up the procurement process and enhance cost sharing in the research, development and manufacturing stages but also to likely lead to enhanced interoperability of capabilities, which is a longstanding goal of Canadian defence policy.
The Australian-U.S. MQ-28A Ghost Bat program may also offer a guide for future technological investments. The Ghost Bat is being built in Australia but is a co-development with the U.S. in terms of testing and experimentation regarding its future functionality. By approaching the development of this system as an inter-allied process, Australia has been able to utilize the considerable resources and research capabilities of the U.S. to improve the capacities of the system while also reducing costs and expediating the entire procurement process.xxxv Canadian defence procurement has long been problematic and the system has been unable to deliver projects in a timely manner, and so inter-allied joint projects have the potential to offset many of those constraining elements of the process. This is particularly needed as the current generation of emerging technologies are evolving at such a rapid rate that any extended delays in procurement will considerably exacerbate existing challenges.
Procurement
The procurement efforts of the other FVEY states demonstrate that the Canadian system is likely inefficient in generating outputs in a timely manner. This dysfunctional procurement system has impacted both larger projects as well as smaller systems. For example, the U.K. and Australia have already joined the U.S. in operating the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, while Canada will only begin to operate the aircraft in 2026. The F-35 experience shows that cooperative technological programs can achieve a desired effect for other allies, however, the Canadian participation in the project illuminates that its procurement system has fundamental difficulties in successfully leveraging similar benefits. The rest of FVEY are already operating RPS, and now Australia is even manufacturing their own domestically designed and developed variants, while Canada is still in the preliminary procurement stages for similar technologies. Other FVEY members are looking to streamline their procurement systems to work closer with domestic industry and international partners, so they do not get constrained or delayed by internal bureaucratic requirements. As newer emerging technologies, such as AI, quantum computing and 3D printing, become more common in the defence sphere, Canada will be at a disadvantage in procuring initial systems compared to its FVEY partners as it will be unable to generate procurement outputs in a fast enough manner to operationalize the newer technology. Changes to the way in which procurement unfolds will be needed or else Canada will remain on the outside looking in.
Canada has among the least developed RPS capabilities among FVEY. For example, not only has the U.S. military been operating RPS for decades, but also released their initial RPS related strategy guide Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 nearly twenty years ago.xxxvi Canada’s attempt to fulfill the SSE initiative to procure more robust RPS capabilities has undergone several disruptions in the procurement process, including having several companies withdraw their bids. Positively, in 2023, Canada has taken further steps towards finalizing their first contract to purchase a small fleet of MQ-9 Reaper Drones, with the anticipated first delivery date of 2028.xxxvii In comparison, in 2018 Australia announced its intention to acquire the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton surveillance drones, oversaw its first operational test in 2023, with delivery to the ADF to begin in 2024.xxxviii If the Canadian Sky Guardian Drones are successfully delivered in 2028, that will mark 11 years from SSE’s release, which should be considered an unacceptable timeline from the initial policy decision to procurement output; indicating that procurement processes of emerging technologies is in need of significant reform.
RPS is an area which should be prioritized by DND and CAF for future investments. RPS should be an attractive option, given their relatively cheaper cost and manufacturing cycle compared to larger platforms such as manned aircraft and warships. RPS are a platform with the potential for wide applicability given they have relevancy to almost every major CAF mission, from SAR to conventional warfighting. RPS technology is also rapidly evolving, presenting new opportunities for their usage. For example, in a recent briefing note, we discussed the operational relevancy of First Person View (FPV) Drones, which have been used to highly lethal effect during the recent Russo-Ukraine War and can cost as little as $300-600 USD per unit.xxxix In future, Canada could develop and acquire several smaller RPS systems offering the CAF a wide range of options for future operations.
Other FVEY members such as Australia have been successful during procurement processes by prioritizing some projects over others; for example, opting not to invest in the B1-Raider program as part of AUKUS in order to focus on the acquisition of nuclear submarines.xl In addition to prioritizing certain procurement projects over others to further expedite things, perfection of choice should be avoided, rather, successful bids should meet sufficient conditions in order for more rapid integration of new technologies to help the CAF meet current challenges. SSE, and all of the major FVEY defence policy strategic documents all agree that the world is characterized by a rapidly changing international security environment, and so quicker decision making is needed when deciding which technologies to invest in, and how they are tangibly integrated into the CAF.
The relevancy of AI to DND and CAF is considerable and needs to be prioritized in terms of procurement projects and its integration into the CAF. The applicability of AI to military affairs is considerable, impacting everything from C4 to targeting, to sustainment logistics and even a variety of business operations like human resources management. Most notably, is that it can be used in turn to enhance the effectiveness of multiple other emerging technology, including RPS via human-machine teaming, space-based systems, cyberspace systems and digitized networking.xli Due to the broad applicability of AI, it can be utilized by the Army, RCAF and RCN along with civilian DND equally, thus helping to build and enhance joint force efforts. Further, AI technology is advancing at an incredibly rapid pace, so any sort of delayed procurement and integration process runs significant risk of harming the strategic and operational effectiveness of the CAF. If Canada waits too long to initiate multiple AI programs across DND and CAF, it will not only be left behind by its allies, but also likely international adversaries. The development of AI, along with space and cyber capabilities can all potentially be enhanced and expedited via closer partnerships with Canada’s thriving private tech sector. The U.S., U.K. and Australia have all signaled they are leaning on partnerships with their respective domestic civilian technological sectors to accelerate their AI related procurements.
JADC2
Every member of FVEY has identified JADC2 as having considerable relevancy to the future of global military affairs. Unfortunately, at present, Canada lags behind the U.S., U.K. and Australia in terms of implementing a successful vision into its military. JADC2 is being developed first and foremost in the U.S., which has considerably more resources and personnel, as well as having different organizational culture than the CAF. This presents a conceptual problem for the CAF as it first and foremost needs to draft a central strategy that redefines the JADC2 in a CAF organizational context. Then, prioritize key technological investments which can accelerate the concept’s establishment across the military in a joint context. Currently, the CAF’s Digital Campaign Plan touches on some issues relating to JADC2, however it does not go far enough. Fundamentally, there remains a considerable gap between the CAF’s current capabilities and planned capabilities and the practical implementation of JADC2. Cloud based computing and digital integration will almost certainly need to play a major role in any proper implementation of the JADC2, particularly for facilitating joint operations across the different services of the CAF. Adopting changes that facilitate the building of cloud-based infrastructure across the CAF will go a long way to fast-tracking the adoption of the concept and allowing Canada to catch up to its allies.
Conclusion
The release of SSE represented a first step for updating Canadian defence policy. However, the defence modernization experiences of FVEY since the release of SSE has demonstrated that Canada is lagging behind its allies when it come to the integration of emerging and advanced technologies for national defence. This suggests there is considerable opportunity for Canada to learn from their experiences to leverage best practices to improve its own defence modernization efforts. This should include further exploration of the internal mechanisms, structures and process of other FVEY members when it comes to the procurement of emerging technologies. Further comparative study can provide the necessary analysis to allow Canada to think more creatively about new approaches to procurement, research and development as well as the formal integration of such technologies for national defence purposes. This will allow the CAF to be better prepared to meet the most pressing challenges of the contemporary strategic environment, such as improving continental defence and strengthening connected battlespace capabilities.
Annex 1: Selected Technological Systems and Projects Discussed in Recent United States Defence Documents
AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)
AI and Machine Learning applications, research and development
AIM 120D Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile
Air Intercept Missile-9X (AIM-9X),
AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Missile (JASSM)
AH-64E Apache Helicopter
AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) program
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
Anti-Radiation Guided Missile Upgrades
Arleigh Burke class (DDG 51) Guided Missile Destroyers Upgrades
Arrow Weapons System Upgrades (Israeli cooperative Program)
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
Armed Overwatch Aircraft
Artificial Intelligence Program Research and Development
AS(X) Submarine Tender Replacement
Attack and Utility Helicopters
Avionics and Datalinks Equipment Upgrades
B-21 Raider Long Range Strike Bomber
B61-12 Tail Kit Gravity Weapon
Battle Force Ships (BFS)
Big Data Analytics Systems Investments
Biological Technology Research and Development
Block 8.1 and Communication Modernization
Block V Fast Attack Virginia class submarines
Bomber Recapitalization – Legacy Aircraft Funding for B-1B, B-2, and B-52H Aircraft Upgrades
C–130J Hercules Modernization
C4ISR System Upgrades
CH-47F Chinook Modernization
CH-53K King Stallion helicopter
Chemical Demilitarization Program (CDP)
Constellation Class Frigates (FFG-62)
Cyber Assets and Systems Research and Development
Data Processing Equipment
Davids Sling Weapon System (Israeli Cooperative Program)
DDG-51 Class Surface Combatants
Directed Energy (lasers, particle beams, etc.), Research and Development
Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN)
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Aircraft
E-7A Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft
Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS)
Extended Range (AARGM-ER) Program
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV)
F-15C/D Eagle Fighter
F15EX Aircraft
F-22 Raptor Fifth Generation Fighter
F35 Joint Strike Fighter A and B variants
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet
Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles (FHTV)
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
Fire Control Systems Upgrades
Fifth Generation Communications, Research and Development
Ford Class Nuclear Aircraft Carriers
GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) I and II versions
Global Positioning System (GPS) III Space Vehicles (SVs)
GPS Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX)
Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) upgrades
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
Guided Missile Weapon System (GMWS)
Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radio program
Heavy Tactical Vehicles recapitalisation
HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopter
HELLFIRE II AGM-114R
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Program (HGV)
Hypersonic Missiles (offensive and defensive), research and development
Information Systems Security Program
Iron Dome Upgrades (Israeli cooperative Program)
Javelin ATGM
John Lewis class Fleet Oiler (TAO)
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM)
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM),
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Joint Regional Security Stacks
KC-46A Pegasus Tanker
LGM-35A Sentinel
Link-16 Communication System
Line of Sight (LOS) / Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)
Long Range Discrimination Radar
Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon program
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
M109A7 Paladin Integrated Management upgrades
M1A2 Abrams MBT modernization
Manned Reconnaissance Aircraft Modernization
Medium Tactical Vehicle FMTV upgrades
Missile defense tracking and discrimination sensors
MQ-25A Stingray the Unmanned Carrier Aviation System Development
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles Upgrades
Microelectronics, research and development
Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE)
MH-139A Gray Wolf Helicopter
MQ-1C Gray Eagle RPS
MQ-4C Triton RPS
MQ-9 Reaper RPS
Multi Object Kill Vehicle program (MOKV)
National Security Space Launch (NSSL) launch services
Naval Strike Missile (NSM)
Next Generation Air Dominance 6th Gen Fighter
Next Generation Interceptor (NGI)
Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR)
Night Vision upgrades
Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV)
On-the-Move (OTM) satellite
Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)
Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept of Target (PATRIOT)
Precision Strike Missile (PSM)
Quantum Computing Research and Development
Resilient Missile Warning and Missile Tracking (MW/MT)
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
RM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
RPS systems – various
Satellite Research and Development
Sea-Based Weapons System (Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD))
Secure communication and tactical warning and attack assessment satellite constellations.
SM-3Blk IIA interceptor
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
Space Force Launch Services (LS)
Space-based Kill Assessment SKA program
Space based network of infrared sensors
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6)
Stryker Armored Vehicle
Tactical and Ballistic Missile Defense Weapons
Tactical Radar system upgrades
Tactical Vehicle upgrades
Tactical wheeled vehicle fleet modernization via Joint Light Tactical Vehicles
Tactical Network Transit At-the-Halt (TNT-ATH)
Tactical Network Technology (TNT) and Modernization in Service (MIS)
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors
Tomahawk Cruise Missile
Trident II D5 Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
UH-60 Black Hawk
USS America class Assault Ship
Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) Program
Upper Tier Interceptor program (Israeli cooperative program)
U.S.S COLUMBIA class ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN)
V-22 Osprey Upgrade
Wideband and Narrowband System Upgrades
Annex 2: Selected Technological Systems and Projects Discussed in Recent United Kingdom Defence Documents
Advanced ground air defence
AH64 Apache Attack Helicopters upgrades
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development
Automated Mobile Fires Platform
Big Data Analytics Systems Investments
CH47 Chinook helicopter replacement
Deep Recce Strike BCT
E7A Wedgetail aircraft
F35 Joint Strike Fighter
Future Combat Air System
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRs)
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance satellite constellation and supporting digital infrastructure
Investments in Big data analytics
Lightening II Weapons Upgrades
Long range artillery systems
Main battle tank upgrades (Challenger III)
Medium Lift helicopter
Multi Role Support Ships (MRSS)
P8A Poseidon aircraft
Quantum Computing
Radar 2 programme
SPEAR Cap 3 Precision Munitions
Skynet 6 programme – satellite communication capabilities
Small and Medium RPS
Type 31 and Type 32 frigates
Type 83 destroyers
Unmanned Aircraft Watchkeeper upgrade
Various autonomous platforms including swarming drones
Annex 3: Selected Technological Systems and Projects Discussed in Recent Australian Defence Documents
Adelaide Class Frigate
Advanced Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Capability
Aeronautical Life Support Equipment Update
Air Battlespace Management Capabilities
Airborne Early Warning and Control System
AIR90 Mode 5 IFF Upgrade
Aircraft self protection and counter-measures systems
Air Warfare Destroyer
Amphibious Watercraft Replacement
Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment Capabilities
ANZAC Air Search Radar Replacement
ANZAC class frigate modernization
ANZAC Ship Anti-Ship Missile Defence
Anti-submarine weapons (including anti-submarine torpedoes for air and surface assets)
Anti-Torpedo defence capabilities for surface fleet
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Replacement
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Weapons System
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development
B300 King Air
Battlefield Command System
Battlespace Communications System (LAND)
Battle Management System
Battlespace Communication Systems
Big data analytics systems
Boxer Reconnaissance Vehicle
C130J Hercules Replacement
C-17A Globemaster Heavy Lift
C-27J Spartan Light Tactical Fixed Wing Aircraft
CA49 Uncrewed Aerial Systems
CH-47F Chinook
Canberra Class (LHD) Sustainment
Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle
Command and Intelligence Systems
Communication and surveillance satellite systems
Communications Security (COMSEC) Remediation
Collins Class Communications Upgrades
Collins Class Sonar Upgrade
Collins Class Submarine reliability and sustainability
Collins Submarines Program
Deployable Defence Air Traffic Management and Control System
Diesel Attack Class submarines, 12 in quantity
Direct Energy Weapons Research and Development
Engineer Support Platforms
Enhanced air launched munitions
Enhanced F88 Austeyr
EA18G Growler Electronic Attack Aircraft
F35A Joint Strike Fighter
F/A-18F Block II Superhornet Weapons System
Fixed Defence Ait Traffic Control Surveillance Sensors
Force Level Tactical Electronic Warfare
Future Naval Aviation Combat System
Future Tank System
G-Wagon Fleet
General Service B Vehicle Fleet
Geospatial Support Systems for the Land Force
Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Capability
Guided Missile Frigate Upgrade Implementation
Helicopter Aircrew Training System
High speed long range strike munitions
Hobart Class Destroyer modernization, quantity of 3
Hobart Class DDG Operational Test and Evaluation
Hunter Class Frigates, nine in quantity.
Hypersonic missiles Research and Development
IED Detection Systems
Improved Embarked Logistics Support Helicopter
ISR aircraft (Crewed and RPS variants)
Jindalee Operational Radar Network Expansion
Joint Air Battle Management System
Joint Counter Improvised Explosive Device Capability
Joint Data Networks
Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft
JORN Mid Life Upgrade
KC30A Air to Air Refueler Replacement
Land Combat Vehicle System (Infantry Fighting Vehicle)
Land Command Control Communications System Modernization
LAND 8710 Army Littoral Manoeuvre Vessels
Lead-in Fighter Hawk 127 Weapon System
Lethality System Project (LAND 159)
Long range rocket system
Loitering Munitions
M1 Abrams MBT Modernization
MH-60R Seahawk Romeo Weapon Systems
Maritime Communications Modernisation
Maritime long range munitions
Maritime Mining Capabilities
Maritime Operational Support Capability (Replenishment Ships)
Maritime surface to surface guided munitions (including both anti-ship and ship to shore capabilities)
Maritime Tactical RPS
Maritime Surface to Air weapons systems
Maritime Warfare and Radar Systems
Mine Hunter Coastal Capabilities
Missile Air Defence systems (Short, Medium and Long Range capabilities)
MQ-28A Ghost Bat RPS
Mobile artillery systems
Multi Role Helicopter Rapid Replacement Project
Navigation Display System
Night Fighting Equipment
New large landing craft
Nuclear submarines (mix of Virgina Class and SSN-AUKUS class)
Nulka Missile Decoy Enhancements
Offshore Patrol Vessels
Overlander – Medium Heavy Capability, Field Vehicles, Modules and Trailers
P-8A Poseidon
P-3C/AP-3C Orion Weapons System
PC-21 Advanced Trainer Aircraft
Phalanx Close-In Weapons System Block Upgrade
Protected Mobility Vehicle – Light and Medium
Rapid Environment Assessment
Replacement aviation Refuelling Vehicles
RPS Systems
Satellite ISR, Communications and Navigation Systems
Sea lift Capabilities
Secure wireless network investments
SM-1 Missile Replacement
Special Forces equipment (small land vehicles; watercraft and long range helicopters)
Special Purpose Aircraft
Tactical Uncrewed Aerial System
Terrestrial based communication networks and supportive digital infrastructure
Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Upgrade
Triton Remotely Piloted Unmanned Aircraft System
Wide Area and Space Surveillance Capabilities
Woomera Range Remediation
Annex 4: Selected Technological Systems and Projects Discussed in Recent New Zealand Defence Documents
Air Surveillance Maritime Patrol (ASMP)
Anzac Frigate Systems Upgrade (FSU)
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development
Armored Bushmaster Vehicle
C-130J-30 Super Hercules
Data Analytics
Dive and Hydrographic Vessel (DHV)
Fixed High Frequency Radio Refresh (FHFRR):
Frigate modernization (combat management system; radar; electronic detection; above water sensors; air defence missile system; anti torpedo capability; hull-mounted sonar; electronic detection)
Frigate Sustainment Communications (FSC)
Future Air Mobility Capability – Tactical (FAMC)
Maritime Sustainment Capability (MSC)
Medium and Heavy Operational Vehicle (MHOV)
Network Enabled Army C44 (NEA C4)
Network Enabled Army Reconnaissance and Surveillance (NEA R&S)
New Zealand Light Operational Vehicle (NZLOV)
New Zealand Light Armored Vehicle (NZLAV)
NH90 Simulator
Operational and Regulatory Aviation Compliance Sustainment (ORACS)
Protected Vehicle – Medium: replacing the armoured Pinzgauer fleet with a fleet of NZ5.5 Bushmaster vehicles
End Notes
i Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2017),
ii Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), available at: ; Joeseph R. Biden, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2022),
iii Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 2018); Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America : Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 2022).
iv Department of Defence, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy (Washington, DC: GPO, March 2022)
v Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: 2019).
vi Department of Defense, NORAD and USNORTHCOM Strategy: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: GPO, March 2021).
vii Department of Defense, Summary of the 2019 Department of Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity (Washington, DC: GOP, 2018)
viii Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, The Untied States Air Force Artificial Intelligence Annex to the Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy (Washington, DC: GOP, 2019); Department of Defense, AI Education Strategy (Washington, DC: GOP, 2020).
ix Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, The Untied States Air Force Artificial Intelligence Annex to the Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy
x Department of Defense, Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway (Washington, DC: GPO, 2022).
xi Department of Defense, Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy (Washington, DC: GOP, 2023),
xii Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the future (Washington, DC: GOP, 2019); Air Force Material Command “Digital Transformation, Air Froce Mateiral Command (2023) Headquarters, Space Force, Operations: Doctrine for Space Forces (Washington, DC: GPO, 2022); Department of the Navy, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power (Washington, DC: GPO, Dec 2020); Headquarters, Marine Corps, Force Design 2030: Annual Update (Washington, DC: GPO, June 2023).
xiii Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Digital Transformation Strategy (Washington, DC: GPO, October 2021); Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Army Strategy (Washington, DC: GPO, 2020),
xiv Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Decision Superiority Vision (Washington, DC: GPO, April 2023).
xv HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age (London, March 2021)
xvi HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, 22
xvii HM, Government, Defence in a Competitive Age (London: March 2021), 38-42; HM, Government, Defence Command Paper 2023: Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world (London: July 2023), 25-33
xviii HM, Government, Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy (London: June 2022)
xix HM Government, Defence Command Paper 2023, 25
xx HM Government, Defence Command Paper 2023, 42
xxi HM, Government, Defence Space Strategy: Operationalizing the Space Domain (London: Feb 2022)
xxii Australian Ministry of Defence, Defence Strategic Review (Canberra: 2023),
xxiii Australian Ministry of Defence, Defence Strategic, 72.
xxiv Defence Strategic Review, 61, 93.
xxv Defence Strategic Review, 58.
xxvi Australian Ministry of Defence, Defence Cyber Security Strategy (Canberra: 2022).
xxvii Australian Ministry of Defence, RAS-AI Strategy 2040 (Canberra: 2020).
xxviii New Zealand Ministry of Defence, Defence Assessment 2021 (Wellington: 2021); New Zealand Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 (Wellington: 2023).
xxixNew Zealand Defence Force, NZDF Strategic Plan 2019-2025 (Wellington: 2019).
xxx New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Defence Doctrine NZDDP-D (Fourth Edition), (Wellington: Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, 2017),
xxxi Salt and Alex Wilner, “Emerging Technology and Canadian Defence”
xxxii Canada, “Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence,”(Ottawa, ON: Department of National of Defence, 2024),
xxxiii Kevin Budning, Alex Wilner, and Guillaume Cote, “From physical to virtual to digital: The Synthetic Environment and its impact on Canadian defence policy,” International Journal, Vol. 77, No. 2 (2022): 335-355,
xxxiv Nika White, “Can AI Become An Ally in the DEI World?,” Forbes (5 July 2023)
xxxv Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force to start new experiments with Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost bat drone,” Breaking Defense (5 October 2022),
xxxvi Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005).
xxxvii David Pugliese, “Canadian military sets stage for purchase of drones and Hellfire missiles; program could cost up to $5 billion,” Ottawa Citizen (22 Sep 2023),
xxxviii Jon Grevatt, “Northrop Grumman conducts first flight of Australian MQ-4C,”, Janes (14 Nov 2023),
xxxix Alexander Salt, “First Person View (FPV) Drones and Canadian Defence,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute (2024),
xl Defence Strategic Review, 61.
xli Forrest E. Morgan et al, “Military Applications of artificial Intelligence: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World,” (Santa Moncia, CA: RAND, 2020),
About the Authors
Dr. Alexander Salt has a PhD from the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies and an MA in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba. His dissertation explores to what extent has the battlefield experience of the U.S. military influenced post-war organizational innovation. His research has been awarded the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s Joseph-Armand Bombardier Doctoral Award, as well as a General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Memorial Dissertation Fellowship. He has published research relating to international security and defence policy with Strategic Studies Quarterly, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, and The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society. Previously, he was a Visiting Political Science Instructor with Macalester College and has also held positions with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, as well as the Consulate General of Canada in Dallas, Texas, and the Consulate General of Canada in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Dr. Alex Wilner is an Associate Professor of International Affairs, at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) at Carleton University. His books include Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice (eds., Cambria Press, 2021), Deterring Rational Fanatics (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), and Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (eds., Stanford University Press, 2012).
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.
The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security.
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